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Abstract 
 
In this essay I examine Julia Kristeva’s transgressive body of work as a 
strategic embodiment of, and argument for, an ethical orientation towards 
otherness predicated on the image of divided subjectivity identified by 
Jacques Lacan but powerfully re-theorised as dialogic by Kristeva. I focus 
on what is, for Kristeva, a stylistically unique essay – “Stabat Mater” – 
which examines a number of institutional discourses about motherhood 
from the western philosophical, religious, and psychoanalytical traditions, 
and simultaneously subverts them with a parallel discourse (and 
enactment) ostensibly by an actual mother. The text itself, I argue, can be 
read as a performance of dialogic subjectivity and of Kristeva’s conception 
of maternality, which implies a radical ethical imperative – termed 
“herethics” – towards alterity. I propose that this herethical model might 
heuristically inform current debates regarding the ethical orientations of 
the study of religions as an academic field. 
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I 
 
Framing: Ethics and Religion 
 
In the last twenty years, the Study of Religions as an academic field has 
undergone what can be described as a “political turn,” that is, an 
accumulating discourse has developed amongst theorists in the field 
drawing attention to how the taxon “religion” is closely tied to three socio-
political regimes of truth:1 (1) the creation of a series of conceptual 
dichotomies –public/private, secular/religious, religion/state – that 
underpin and sustain the project of European modernity and the nation-
state; (2) the colonialist “invention of religion”; (3) the dominance of a 
phenomenological paradigm – exemplified in the work of Mircea Eliade – 
that elevates the sui generis nature of religion in order to protect it from 
reductionist scrutiny. All of these have been critiqued as rendering the 
continuing use of “religion” as a normative epistemological category 
deeply suspect, if not morally and intellectually untenable. A variety of 
analyses have indicated how the academic study of religions, as it 
consolidated its place in the academy,2 traded in a series of rhetorical 
techniques (involving claims to the uniqueness, universality, irreducibility, 
etc. of the datum “religion”) that obscured the manufactured nature of its 
central category of analysis. Concomitantly, these techniques have masked 
the ordinariness of the data cut out as “uniquely religious,” obscured its 
social and thus contingent and interested construction, and in turn have 
contributed to uncritical attitudes, descriptive impotency and an anti-
                                                 
1 Amongst the more prominent contributors to the debates are scholars such as Jonathan 
Z. Smith, whose work was influential in inaugurating the debate, Russell McCutcheon, 
Bruce Lincoln, Willi Braun, Gary Lease, Talal Asad, Donald Wiebe, Samuel Preus, Ivan 
Strenski, and, to a lesser degree, Richard King and Timothy Fitzgerald, Tomoko 
Masuzawa, and Daniel Dubuisson. I do not mean, of course, to suggest that these 
scholars’ various analyses converge or are even in agreement; rather, what they share is an 
interest in the discursive and socio-political operationalisation of the category “religion.”  
2 See, for example, Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1993); Russell McCutcheon, Manufacturing Religion (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997); “The Imperial Dynamic in the Study of Religion,” in C. Richard 
King, ed., Postcolonial America (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 275-302; 
Critics Not Caretakers: Redescribing the Public Study of Religion (Albany: SUNY Press, 
2001); and Timothy Fitzgerald The Ideology of Religious Studies (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), Discourse on Civility and Barbarity: A Critical History of 
Religion and Related Categories (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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theoretical culture. The critical work undertaken by the theorists of the 
political turn has made a compelling case for the attention of scholars of 
religions to be directed to their own discursive practices and orientations in 
order to trace and undo the political effects of the imperialist imposition of 
“religion” on the ordinary practices and cultures of the groups, practices, 
phenomena that are studied.3 A tone discernable throughout much of the 
critical reflection is one of ethical urgency: the very call to attend to the 
underlying assumptions of the field, to those intellectual practices that have 
inscribed distortive, protectionist, or imperialist understandings on the 
data, is an ethical imperative. Take for example Richard King’s assertion 
that a critical assessment of the politics of representation is implicitly an 
ethical enterprise:  
 
Problematizing the way in which Indian religion has been represented within 
Western scholarship ... is an exercise in calling into question the paradigms of 
knowledge and constellations of power that have continued to divide the world up 
into ‘us’ and ‘them’ – maintaining an asymmetrical relationship between the 
relatively powerful and the relatively disempowered. This intellectual and ethical 
‘malaise’ exists, of course, in many forms other than the classic Orientalist division 
between ‘East’ and ‘West’ ... Difference is perceived in oppositional rather than 
pluralistic terms, and differences between cultures become fetishized at the same 
time as internal heterogeneities within each culture are effaced.4 
 
There is little here with which to disagree. However, what I mean to 
exemplify by way of this quotation is a certain kind of equivocality with 
respect to the modelling of ethical orientations that is repeated throughout 
the critical literature of the political turn. The “ethical” premise of 
opposition to oppressive forms of representation is taken as given, but 
there is rarely concrete proposals of ethical models that might drive 
forward attempts to be more reflexively attuned to the distortive and 
damaging aspects of scholarly representation; no clarity is offered with 
respect to possible means of negotiating a way through the detritus of the 
field’s history; little critical assessment of how the vaguely ethical 
orientations that appear to motivate critical re-assessment of the field’s 
operations might themselves run the risk of making normative 
                                                 
3 See Russell T. McCutcheon The Discipline of Religion: Structure, Meaning, Rhetoric 
(London and New York. 2003), 79-80. 
4 Richard King, Orientalism & Religion: Postcolonial theory, India and ‘the Mystic East’ 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 187-188; my emphasis.  
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pronouncements similar to those they critique.5 If it is ethical to remove 
“religion” from academic vocabulary in order to find richer, more complex 
and situated renderings of particular sets of social practices, will this 
ameliorate the effects of colonialism and its aftermath? To dispense with 
either the category or the object runs the risk of ignoring the ways in which 
both now seem to have lives of their own. Even if “religion” is a scholarly 
invention,6 hyperreal or fictional,7 can we place an embargo on its use in 
scholarly circles and deny its other life, one where it operates strategically 
as a source of valued and collective identification, or as a work of active 
translation and contestation within diasporic frameworks that rework social 
categories? That “religion” is an identity marker as well as an intellectual 
category demands that our focus as scholars not merely a concern with 
epistemological reflection, however important that is; it must also 
necessarily be directed towards the ontological dimensions of our work: to 
people, their valuations and inscriptions, and to our own subjectivities as 
they are constructed in the academic domain and elsewhere. What are our 
ethical responsibilities as we traverse the differential requirements of 
knowledge production and of fidelity to the dignity of people’s experiences 
and accounts of themselves? Does not the critique of the colonial invention 
or imposition of “religion” run the risk of denying or ignoring the creative, 
transformative, and resistant nature of postcolonial conditions?  
Homi Bhabha has suggested, for example, that the discourse of the 
coloniser about the colonised was one of inescapable ambivalence, of 
“hybridity,”8 and this very fact opens up ways of seeing how colonised 
populations were not merely hapless victims of actual and discursive 
tyranny, but were creative and agentive in their resistance and re-
employment of the values and inscriptions of the European metropole such 
that it was acted upon, remade, and deconstructed. In overlooking the 
complex interplay between coloniser and colonised, the critical voices in 
the study of religions, in my view, insufficiently acknowledge the potential 
                                                 
5 See Tyler Roberts’ very effective critique of McCutcheon in this regard in “Exposure 
and Explanation: On the New Protectionism in the Study of Religion,” Journal of the 
American Academy of Religion 72:1 (2004): 143–172. 
6 Smith, Jonathan Z. Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1982), xi. 
7 Sam Gill, “Play,” in eds. Russell T. McCutcheon and Willi Braun Critical Guide to the 
Study of Religion. London: Cassell, 2000), 406. 
8 See particularly Homi K. Bhabha The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 2004), 
101 and 122-124. 
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for subversion that is created by the ambivalence and hybrid space of the 
discourse on/of religion in a colonial/postcolonial frame. To assume 
otherwise is, I think, to cooperate in what is effectively a (neo)colonial 
narrative that denies affective agency to the other whilst accruing to the 
knowing critical scholar a kind of ontological capital that is in the end 
unethical to the degree that it also denies the layered subjectivity of the 
other, of his or her discourse, and of the very hybridity of the scholar’s 
own discourse. How might we formulate and figure then an ethical 
relationship to the hybrid nature of category formation such that “religion” 
might now be remade from and with “the other”? How might we ethically 
both frame and engage with the ambivalence and hybridity that is 
characteristic of the aftermath of the field’s history in a way that might 
avoid unreflexive reliance on, or accidental repetitions of, the oppressive 
binarisations which the political turn has identified? How might we begin 
the task of establishing an ethical orientation that is attuned to the 
complexity and entangled nature of category formation and its relation to 
material conditions? In what follows, I want to examine Julia Kristeva’s 
staging of an ethically unconventional, dialogic relation between self and 
other, and between linguistic modes of signification, and to argue that it 
might serve as a heuristic device for rendering the ethical as a more 
concrete focus of the political turn.  
If there can be said to be a recurrent theme that runs throughout Julia 
Kristeva’s prodigious oeuvre it is arguably a preoccupation with those 
processes through which subject/object boundaries are both constructed 
and broached dialogically. I want to examine Kristeva’s transgressive body 
of work precisely as a strategic embodiment of, and argument for, an 
ethical orientation towards otherness predicated on an image of divided 
and dialogic subjectivity. I will focus on what is, for Kristeva, a 
stylistically unique essay – “Stabat Mater” (1987) – which examines a 
number of institutional discourses about motherhood from the western 
philosophical, religious, and psychoanalytical traditions, and simultaneously 
subverts them with a parallel discourse (and enactment) ostensibly by an 
actual mother. I will argue that the text itself can be read as a performance 
of dialogic subjectivity and that its embodiment of Kristeva’s conception 
of maternality distils many of the themes that characterise her work 
regarding dialogic subjectivity more generally, all of which imply an 
unconventional – but nonetheless ethical – orientation towards alterity. I 
begin by outlining a number of key Kristevan concepts, particularly the 
“subject-in-process” (sujet en procès) and the dialogic relation of the 
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symbolic and semiotic in language. My discussion here leads me to focus 
on the maternal body as a metaphor of the kind of dialogic subjectivity that 
Mikhail Bakhtin’s conception of dialogue implies and upon which Kristeva 
builds. This metaphor challenges that logic which positions the self in an 
oppositional relation to the other. I undertake a close reading of Kristeva’s 
essay “Stabat Mater” to show how she reorients this logic towards a model 
of subjectivity that she refers to as a “herethics” based on a specific 
rendering of maternality. Herethics refuses the conventional ethical model 
of western metaphysics that postulates an autonomous agent whose 
obligations to the recipient of ethical attention are founded on principles of 
sameness and equivalence rather than a recognition and acceptance of 
difference. Kristeva, in contrast, offers a means of conceiving a notion of 
difference that does not operate according to a dialectic logic of opposition 
but rather as dialogic.  
 
II 
 
The Subject-in-Process/on-Trial 
 
The phenomena which interest me are precisely those that blur the boundaries, 
cross them, and make their historical artifice appear, also their violence, meaning 
the relations of force that are concentrated there and actually capitalize themselves 
there interminably. Those who are sensitive to all the stakes of ‘creolization’… 
assess this better than others.9 
 
Kristeva arrived in Paris from Bulgaria to begin graduate study in 1966, 
the year that Jacques Lacan published his Écrits. Her doctoral dissertation, 
published as La Révolution du Langage Poétique: L’avant-garde à la Fin 
du XIXéme Siècle (1974; translated as Revolution in Poetic Language in 
1984), brought together theoretical concerns with avant-garde literature, 
the somatic elements of language, borderline psychological states, the 
nature of public discourse, and the acquisition by children of language. 
Because of the coincidence between the ideas developed in this work and 
Lacan’s structuralist theories of infantile development, she became 
interested in psychoanalysis. Between 1976 and 1979 she trained as a 
psychoanalyst and has since practiced in Paris whilst holding a chair in 
                                                 
9 Jacques Derrida, Monolingualism of the Other, OR, The Prosthesis of Origin, trans. 
Patrick Mensah (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 9. 
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linguistics in the Department of Texts and Documents, University of Paris 
VII, periodically teaching in comparative literature at Columbia University. 
Her work is a reflection of her own border crossings, moving as it does 
between disciplines, paradigms, genres, styles and subject positions.10 
These “crossings” for Kristeva are reflected in her suggestion that 
subjectivity itself is a form of crossing, of self-formation in the space 
between self and other that occurs through and in the encounter between 
selves. She theorises subjectivity as tenuous and processual: 
 
All identities are unstable: the identity of linguistic signs, the identity of meaning 
and, as a result the identity of the speaker. And in order to take account of this 
destabilization of meaning and of the subject I thought the term ‘subject in process’ 
would be appropriate.  Process in the sense of process but also in the sense of a 
legal proceeding where the subject is committed to trial, because our identities in 
life are constantly called into question, brought to trial, over-ruled.11 
 
Her theorisation of subjectivity in this regard is indebted to Mikhail 
Bakhtin’s dialogic model of communication and subjectivity, one that she 
uses to good effect to understand the constitution of the self by analogy 
with textual signification – its unfolding as a process rather than as a 
completed product bearing the signature of a single author. For Bakhtin, 
the subject is not autonomous, self-originating, nor transcendent; rather it 
is produced as an effect of (and in the process of) the interactions and 
communications – the dialogue – between individuals: 
 
In reality the relations between A and B are in a state of permanent formation and 
transformation; they continue to alter in the very process of communication. Nor is 
there a ready-made message X. It takes form in the process of communication 
between A and B. Nor is it transmitted from the first to the second, but constructed 
between them, like an ideological bridge; it is constructed in the process of their 
interaction.12 
 
                                                 
10 See Birgitte Huitfeldt Midttun, (2006) “Crossing the Borders: An Interview with Julia 
Kristeva,” Hypatia 21: 4 (2006), 164-177; Marilyn Edelstein ‘Metaphor, Meta-Narrative, 
and Mater-narrative in Kristeva’s “Stabat Mater”’ in David Crownfield, ed., Body/Text in 
Julia Kristeva: Religion, Women, and Psychoanalysis (Albany, NY: SUNY, 1992), 27–
52. 
11 Julia Kristeva and Susan Sellers, “A Question of Subjectivity—An Interview,” 
Women’s Review 12 (1989): 19. 
12 Mikhail Bakhtin in Tzvetan Todorov, Mikhail Bakhtin, trans. Wlad Godzich 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 55. 
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According to Kristeva, Bakhtin shows how dialogism is “inherent in 
language itself,” that it signals “another logic…the logic of distance and 
relationship…indicating a becoming – in opposition to the level of 
continuity and substance, both of which obey the logic of being and are 
thus monological.”13 “Becoming,” here, signifies a fluid and ongoing 
process of subjectification, whereas “being” signifies closure and 
completeness.14 Dialogism is thus an “other logic” to a dialectic framing of 
the subject; it is one of “analogy and nonexclusive opposition, opposed to 
monological levels of causality and identifying determination.”15 In 
differentiating the dialogic from the dialectic, Kristeva wants to replace an 
oppositional schema with a concept of “relation” which does not “strive 
towards transcendence but rather toward harmony … implying an idea of 
rupture … as a modality of transformation.”16 This effort underlies all her 
work on the interdependence of seemingly oppositional categories and the 
development of models that can respond to and exemplify a dialogic 
system as part of an ethical project of resisting those “totalitarian” social 
systems which seek to banish alterity from the scene of subjectivity and 
consolidate subjectivity as monologic. She understands the unsettling of 
oppositional thought to consist in the alignment of ethics with sites of 
negativity – of that which is marginalised or effaced by singularity – in 
order to challenge the binary logic that places the other as inimical to the 
self.17  
For Kristeva, subjectivity is also a form of intertextuality in which 
human beings, like texts, are signs of the intersection of multiple voices, 
multi-layered and plural.18 One of the most distinctive ways in which she 
                                                 
13 Julia Kristeva Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art, trans. 
Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 68. 
14 There is a parallel here between this becoming/being construction and the Levinasian 
formulation of the Saying and the Said (le Dire et le Dit). See Emmanuel Levinas, 
Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essences, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1981), inter alia. 
15 Kristeva, Desire, 71-72. 
16 Kristeva, Desire, 88-89. 
17 Indeed, Kristeva has stated that she is interested in discourses that disintegrate those 
forms of identity that are constituted as monological and atomised because she is a woman 
(a site of negativity) and that her work consequently “obeys ethical exigencies.” Julia 
Kristeva in eds. Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron, New French Feminisms: An 
Anthology (New York: Schocken Books, 1981), 138. 
18 She draws here on Bakhtin’s concept of intertextuality to refer to a particular kind of 
textual history able to trace the citational influences and derivations of texts as they 
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theorises this heterogeneity is through her reconfiguration of Jacques 
Lacan’s tripartite model of infantile development and her challenge to its 
temporal linearity. She subsequently is able, more adequately than Lacan, 
to model the processual nature of plural subjectivity by attending to the 
dialogic quality in language of materiality and the psyche. She thus 
develops a theory of two distinct linguistic modalities – the “semiotic” and 
the “symbolic” – that characterise both subjectivity and signification.19 For 
Kristeva, like Lacan, the “symbolic” is the realm of language and culture, 
operationalised by the metaphoric paternal interdict that inaugurates 
subjectivity in the figure of the law of the Father (“nom-du-père”20). Her 
concept of the “semiotic” – which has no precise parallel in Lacan’s three-
part scheme of Imaginary, Symbolic and Real – is the realm of the body, 
the drives and the unconscious that is ‘remembered’ in language. For 
Kristeva, the semiotic “logically and chronologically precedes the 
establishment of the symbolic and its subject,”21 and yet symbolic and 
semiotic permanently and dynamically co-exist in the subject and in 
language: “Since the subject is always both semiotic and symbolic, any 
signifying system he/she produces is never ‘exclusively’ symbolic, but 
necessarily marked by a debt to the other modality.”22 The semiotic and the 
symbolic are thus in continual dialogue. 
Kristeva’s concept of the “semiotic” suggests the interpellation into 
signification of elements of corporeality (rhythm, flow, inflection) which 
the symbolic never succeeds in replacing and dominating; its supposedly 
rational formulations can never master the semiotic inasmuch as the 
territory of reason is continually transgressed by corporeal rhythms and 
flows. As Kristeva argues, “these two modalities are inseparable within the 
signifying process that constitutes language;”23 the subject-in-process must 
always negotiate this terrain, must dwell within and be constituted by the 
                                                                                                                          
encounter others: “any text is constructed of a mosaic of quotations; any text is the 
absorption and transformation of another.” Kristeva, Kristeva Reader, 37. 
19 Kristeva makes a distinction, clearer in French, between “semiotics” (la sémiotique) – 
the study of signifying systems – and the semiotic (le sémiotique) – the non-syntactical 
element of language. 
20 See Jacques Lacan Écrits: A Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1977), 73-74 inter alia. 
21 Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, trans. Margaret Waller (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1984), 41. 
22 Kristeva, Revolution, 22. 
23 Kristeva, Revolution, 24. 
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process of this negotiation. Thus, the semiotic and symbolic, materiality 
and language, coexist as heterogeneous partners within the Symbolic 
register rather than remaining in a linear temporal relation. Signification is 
always heterogeneous, a combination of symbolic syntactical stability and 
semiotic materiality, of conscious articulation and unconscious drives: 
 
To keep an account of this heterogeneity implies that one no longer consider the 
symbolic function as super-corporeal, super-biological and super-material, but as 
produced by a dialectic between two orders. Therefore, rather than of ‘symbolism’, 
we will speak of the semiotic as the place of this heterogeneity of sense.24 
 
Although Kristeva refers here to the relation between the semiotic and the 
symbolic as a “dialectic” (which for Lacan it is), the relationship actually 
seems more dialogic (in the Bakhtinian sense). She stresses that it is not 
only the psychological (conscious/unconscious) aspects of the self that are 
produced in language but also the physical (the semiotic) insofar as the 
body has a central role in the signifying process, interacting with and in 
dialogue with those elements of language configured as syntactical. 
Kristeva intends to restore materiality to the domain of signification in 
order to demonstrate how the “instinctual rhythm” of the semiotic 
punctures, punctuates and disrupts stable meaning but is absolutely 
necessary for the production of meaning in language.25 Kristeva wants, 
therefore, to reimagine the space of signification (language itself) as a site 
where signification processes are simultaneously systematic (governed by 
pre-existent rules) and corporeal (contingent, contextual and disruptive).  
Although Kristeva theorises several ways in which the semiotic and 
symbolic intersect to produce signification, she primarily figures the 
semiotic as the disposition – the rhythms and sounds of merged bodies – 
that exists in the pre- and post-natal mother-child dyad as formulated by 
classic psychoanalysis.26 Thus, Kristeva plays on the notion of the 
corporeal exchanges between mother and child prior to language exchange 
to indicate the dialogic nature of linguistic exchange. The corporeal 
exchange that constitutes the fusion of the maternal body with that of the 
infant is conceived by Kristeva as a foundational dialogue that precedes the 
syntactical exchanges operationalised by the inauguration of the subject in 
the symbolic. The semiotic is a dialogue before language, and the fluidity 
                                                 
24 Julia Kristeva, Polylogue (Paris: Seuil, 1977), 76. 
25 Kristeva, Revolution, 100. 
26 Kristeva, Desire, 157. 
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of its mode of exchange crosses into and is thus re-membered in the space 
of the symbolic. The semiotic is transgressive; it is mobile, crossing 
borders between bodies; it thus ensures the subject, constituted as a 
dialogic division, will always remain in process. Importantly, for Kristeva 
dialogue requires division, it requires a space between. Dialogue implies a 
crossing over rather than the crossing out that a dialectic model of 
bifurcated relationality necessitates. Moreover, the kind of subjectivity 
characteristic of the dialogic modality is one that is necessarily incomplete, 
open to the other, requiring the other for moments of self-constitution. At 
the heart of Kristeva’s attempt to signify the interrelatedness of self and 
other, therefore, is an effort to guarantee the possibility of creativity and 
change; to resist the violence of the dialectic model inscribed in the 
Lacanian isolation of the symbolic by demonstrating its own porousness 
and openness. The mother’s body and relation to her child, more than any 
other image Kristeva presents, offers an imaginative figuration of a 
dialogic relation of self and other, one that holds out the possibility of a 
“heretical ethics” that provides a contrastive foil to the ontotheological 
convention of phronesis that presupposes atomised subjectivity. Kristeva 
theorises a performative model of this figuration most solidly in her essay 
“Stabat Mater” (1987).27 
 
III 
 
“There stood the Mother:” Maternality and the Split 
Subject 
 
“Stabat Mater” is an essay both generically and stylistically unique 
within Kristeva’s oeuvre, and appears to be an experiment in experimental 
writing, a form of “postmodern” writing that she refers to elsewhere as 
“writing-as-the-experience-of limits.”28 The essay is typographically split 
between two columns: the right-hand column constitutes the majority of 
the text and is written in a conventional academic style; the left-hand 
                                                 
27 Originally published as “Héréthique de l’amour” (1977); renamed “Stabat Mater” when 
it was included in Kristeva’s Histoire d’amour (1983), later translated in English as Tales 
of Love (1987). All citations are from Tales of Love. 
28 Julia Kristeva “Postmodernism?,” Bucknell Review 25 (1980): 137. 
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column, in bold typeface, has a more impressionistic and personal tone.29 
Both the content and the form of “Stabat Mater” indicate, I will suggest, 
that it should be read as a performative staging of an alternative discourse 
on motherhood from the point of view of a mother. In so doing it seeks to 
resist, and indeed refute, the totalising narratives of both Christian 
Mariology and the paternal romance of Freudian psychoanalysis, replacing 
these instead with a narrative of dialogic maternality. The text effectively 
instantiates the dialogic relationship between the semiotic and the 
symbolic, weaving together its two styles to demonstrate the ways in which 
the semiotic and the symbolic coexist in language, suggesting an 
analogical relationship with maternality. The right-hand column, which 
begins the essay and which appears to describe Kristeva’s own experience 
of motherhood, is continually disrupted by the left-hand column. The left-
hand account interleaves the right-hand column, occasionally seeming to 
mimic its tone and sometimes disappearing altogether. The columns finish 
almost simultaneously. 
The essay begins with an analysis of the Virgin Mother, the most 
resonant symbol of motherhood in western socio-religious discourses 
where the “consecrated (religious or secular) representation of femininity 
is absorbed by motherhood.”30 Kristeva points out that this image is a 
“fantasy…of a lost territory” that involves “less an idealized archaic 
mother than the idealization of the relationship that binds us to her, one 
that cannot be localized.”31 She argues that the figure of the Virgin Mary is 
a fundamentally unsatisfactory and paradoxical construction – both virgin 
and mother, unique (“alone among women”) and simultaneously a generic 
model for all women, that encourages them to be self-sacrificing and 
submissive to male authority. Kristeva’s argument is that Mary is, in 
essence, projected as a mother solely for others, and that she represents a 
form of “masculine sublimation”:  
 
What is there, in the portrayal of the Maternal in general and particularly in its 
Christian, virginal, one that reduces social anguish and gratifies a male being; what 
is there that also satisfies a woman so that a commonality of the sexes is set up, 
beyond and in spite of their glaring incompatibility and permanent warfare?32 
                                                 
29 I indicate in bold type any quotations from the left-hand column. 
30 Julia Kristeva Tales of Love, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1987), 234. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., 236. 
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She further asks if  
 
… there is something in that Maternal notion that ignores what a woman might say 
or want – as a result, when women speak out today it is in matters of conception 
and  motherhood that their annoyance is basically centred.33  
 
Kristeva suggests that certain forms of feminism consequently demand a 
“new representation of femininity” but in doing so they mistake the 
idealised representation of motherhood that the Virgin Mary appears to 
represent as the only possible discourse of femininity within patriarchy and 
so they reject it. However, as a result feminists “circumvent the real 
experience that the fantasy overshadows” and simultaneously acquiesce to 
its power by granting it a hegemonic status.34 In many ways, the left-hand 
column of “Stabat Mater” appears to parody the style of l’écriture 
féminine,35 but it is accompanied by the rigorously analytical right-hand 
column which enables Kristeva to avoid what she suggests is the 
“Manichean position which consists in designating as feminine” the kind 
of language that is characterised by the “imprecise … with impulses, 
perhaps with primary processes” and which results in “maintaining women 
in a position of inferiority, and, in any case, of marginality.”36 
The right-hand column analyses three main themes in the “incredible 
construct of the Maternal that the West elaborated by means of the 
Virgin.”37 Kristeva begins by examining the social context in which the 
Church came to present Mary’s immaculate conception (an idea that 
became dogma in 1854) and suggests that it was a way of asserting her 
sexlessness which could then be extended to link her to sinlessness and 
therefore to deathlessness. Noting that the doctrine of Mary’s Assumption 
was proclaimed dogma in 1950, she suggests that this may have served as a 
consoling fiction: “What death anguish was it intended to soothe after the 
conclusion of the deadliest of wars?.”38 The second theme is the 
representation of Mary as queen of heaven, again linked to social 
                                                 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 234. 
35 Kristeva seems to have in her sights the gynocentric theorisation of l’écriture féminine 
associated most prominently with Hélène Cixous, as a kind of linguistic expression unique 
to a feminine libidinal economy, uncontaminated by patriarchal language, and characterised 
by its defiance of conventional syntax, its mellifluous tone and allusive quality. 
36 Kristeva, Revolution, 122-123. 
37 Kristeva, Tales, 256. 
38 Ibid., 244. 
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exigencies, particularly the attempt by the Church to legitimise its earthly 
power. Finally, she examines the symbol of Mary as a “prototype of love,” 
and associates this idea with courtly love where “Mary and the Lady 
shared one common trait: they are the focal point of men’s desires and 
aspirations.”39 Throughout, the purpose of the analysis is to suggest that 
while the various constructs of the Virgin Mary may have served some 
“women’s wishes for identification” insofar as they include a symbol of 
femininity in an otherwise masculine religious paradigm, they more 
obviously functioned to stabilise society by mediating between the 
“unconscious needs of primary narcissism” and the social requirement of 
“the contribution of the…symbolic paternal agency.”40 Whatever one may 
think about the psychoanalytic paradigm that informs the analysis, what is 
more important is Kristeva’s interest in the needs that the construct of 
Mary does not resolve, at least for many contemporary women. Her 
intention is to offer a narrative of maternality, of women’s relationships to 
their own mothers and to their children, that is not accounted for in the 
Marian account. Further, although she appears to derive the impetus for her 
work from psychoanalysis, she wants to address the Freudian omission of a 
theory of motherhood:  
 
The fact remains, as far as the complexities and pitfalls of maternal experience are 
involved, that Freud offers only a massive nothing which … is punctuated with this 
or that remark on the part of Freud’s mother, proving to him in the kitchen that his 
own body is anything but immortal and will crumble away like dough; or the sour 
photograph of Marthe Freud, the wife, a whole mute story …41 
 
It is precisely at the point in the right-hand column where the word 
“maternal” is first invoked that the left-column first appears. Here Kristeva 
begins to writes of a mother’s own desire – her jouissance – the intensely 
sensual pleasure of mothering, but also of her pain, alluding to the lack of 
separation between the mother’s body and the child’s:  
 
My body is no longer mine, it doubles up, suffers, bleeds, catches cold, puts its 
teeth in, slobbers, coughs, is covered with pimples, and it laughs. And yet, 
when its own joy, my child’s, returns, its smile washes only my eyes. But the 
pain, its pain – it comes from inside, never remains apart, other, it inflames 
me at once, without a second’s respite. As if it was what I had given birth to 
                                                 
39 Ibid., 245. 
40 Ibid., 259 
41 Ibid., 255. 
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and, not willing to part from me, insisted on coming back, dwelled in me 
permanently. One does not give birth in continuous … But a mother is always 
branded by pain, she yields to  it.42 
 
Several important ideas are expressed in this passage, and are repeated 
throughout the text, all of which seem to confirm that the left-hand column 
can be feasibly read as representative of the semiotic: it stresses doubling; 
it describes the continuous oscillation between unity and separation that 
constitutes the relationship between the mother and child; it references 
somatic experiences; and it suggests an ambivalence between inside and 
outside that is a transgression of boundaries. Moreover, and significantly, it 
seems that it is the mother, rather than the child, who will henceforth 
struggle with the experience of separation and thus with a clear and 
singular identity: the very process of coming to motherhood and to the new 
subjectivity implied, is driven by encounter with an other who is at the 
same time not quite other.  
The first two left-hand passages do not use any personal pronouns; it is 
only in the third passage that these appear and it is at that point in the text 
that gender identity and difference appear. Kristeva later establishes a 
connection between the lack of identificatory pronouns and motherhood 
when she remarks that “the languages of the great formerly matriarchal 
civilizations must avoid, do avoid, personal pronouns” and that they 
rely instead on “trans-verbal communication between bodies … A 
woman’s discourse, would that be it?.”43 This statement seems to 
essentialise not only women but also mothers, and one might therefore be 
justified in suggesting – as several of her critics have – that the left-hand 
column, as a “woman’s discourse” is reduced to a biological, essentially 
inarticulable, form of communication. However, the column does not 
remain in this register. The dialogue between the two columns increasingly 
overlaps in both style and content, suggesting that the ostensible “woman’s 
discourse” is inseparable from, certainly entwined with, the more 
“symbolic” discourse of the right-hand column.  
The right-hand column occupies the greater part of the text and thus 
seems to be the dominant voice, merely interrupted by the fragmentary, 
impressionistic statements of the left-hand “semiotic” column. However, 
the two columns do not remain isomorphic; they appear progressively in 
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dialogue as they repeat and exchange themes, motifs and terminology, 
overlapping, echoing and anticipating each other. The semiotic elements of 
the text appear in the right-hand column too: for example, towards the end 
of the essay when Kristeva requests her readers to “listen to the Stabat 
Mater, and the music, all the music…it swallows up the goddesses and 
removes their necessity.”44 Here, Kristeva alludes both to the maternal 
(“Stabat Mater”) and to the musicality of the semiotic elements of 
signification,45 suggesting that an acknowledgement of the disruptive force 
of the semiotic in the symbolic removes the necessity for impossible 
representations of femininity such as the Virgin Mary. The text is 
resolutely transgressive; words, images and ideas cross back and forth 
between the columns and visually perform the semiotic’s infiltration of the 
symbolic. The notion that the text represents the dialogical relationship 
between the semiotic and symbolic is, therefore, I believe, the key to its 
meaning and it aids reflection on Kristeva’s ideas of the subject-in-process 
and of maternality as an exemplar of the split subject.46 The essay should 
thus be read as an enactment or embodiment of the subject-in-process, the 
split subject, insofar as it appears visibly to require the reader to cross back 
and forth between the two columns and negotiate the space between, in the 
process experiencing the disruptive and vertigo-inducing dialogical tension 
that Kristeva suggests is the nature of signification. 
The split typography of “Stabat Mater” requires that a reader adopt a 
reading strategy to access its meaning; the necessity of this choice further 
occasions the performative elements of the text to come to the fore. Does 
one read the right column first and then the left? Does one attempt a 
complicated synthesis of both columns at once? How does the text position 
the reader? Edelstein suggests that 
  
A reader’s specific relation to, and experience of, this challenging text depends on 
who that reader is – whether a woman, man, another mother, a woman not a 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 263. 
45 The structure of the text appears to mimic the hymn “Stabat Mater” by Giovanni 
Battista Pergolesi (1710–1736) from which the title is taken, which alternates between a 
solo voice and a counterpoint duet and to which the essay makes several allusions. See 
Kristeva, Tales, 245, 251-252 and 263. 
46 Amongst the many commentators on “Stabat Mater,” Marilyn Edelstein alone appears 
to recognise the significance of the essay’s typography, suggesting that its “narrative 
strategies and construction of both its speaking and reading subject(s) are as much part of 
its meaning – and inseparable from – its prepositional statements or theses.” Edelstein 
“Metaphor,” 29. 
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mother, a Christian, etc. For those readers not mothers, the discourse by the mother 
may be alien, exotic, spoken by a sort of “native informant” from the land of 
mothers. For non-Christian readers, the discourse about the Virgin Mary may seem 
merely a description of a quaint or peripheral phenomenon, not a powerful cultural 
myth or religious symbol. Perhaps this text’s ideal imagined reader would be a 
heterosexual Christian woman who has borne at least one son and who knows 
something about theoretical and literary avant gardes. If one doesn’t match this 
description on any or all counts, then perhaps one becomes the very other, even the 
other woman, of whom this text speaks. Does this text love or exclude and 
marginalise such an other?47 
 
This is a pertinent question in view of the seeming preoccupation of the 
text with rethinking relations between self and other, mother and child. 
Edelstein wonders whether Kristeva is speaking in both columns as a 
“subject who knows” in order to employ an exclusionary textual strategy, 
concluding, however, that the “other reader” could “decide to read the 
maternal as metaphorical in order not to be excluded.”48 She argues 
persuasively that the text “makes us all mothers metaphorically, as split-
subjects, or reveals that we are already both [other and mother].”49 Thus, 
the structuring of the text thus forces the reader not just to read about the 
dialogic tension between the semiotic and the symbolic, but also to 
experience it. The reader, unable to manage or overcome the counterpoint 
voices of “Stabat Mater,” has to encounter a performative dialogic position 
within connected (though possibly competing) discourses. It is a position 
where the production of stable, linear meaning is disrupted through 
encounter with an other meaning: allusive, fragmentary and maternal.  
The typography thus also hints at an analogy with the maternal body 
which Kristeva elsewhere suggests is “the place of splitting”50 and 
indicates that “a woman or mother is a conflict – the incarnation of the split 
of the complete subject, a passion.”51 In “Stabat Mater” she remarks that 
“A mother is a continuous separation, a division of the very self, and 
consequently a division of language – and it has always been so.”52 The 
text appears to be an attempt to embody the mother’s body (as Kristeva 
                                                 
47 Edelstein, “Metaphor,” 39. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., 40. 
50 Julia Kristeva, The Kristeva Reader, ed. Toril Moi (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
1986), 238. 
51 Ibid., 297. 
52 Kristeva, Tales, 254. 
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understands it) as a metaphor for the subject-in-process. The significance 
of the maternal body, specifically the pregnant body, in Kristeva’s work, 
and as exemplified by “Stabat Mater,” is that it cannot be neatly divided 
into subject and object, self and other. For Kristeva, 
 
Pregnancy … is an identity that splits, turns in on itself, and changes without 
becoming other. The threshold between nature and culture, biology and language 
… If pregnancy is a threshold between nature and culture, maternity is a bridge 
between singularity and ethics.53 
 
Making a connection between the Virgin Mary’s pain and that of her son, 
and between his pleasures and hers, Kristeva suggests that mothers are 
“crossroads beings, crucified beings.”54 Here a direct analogy can be 
drawn between the postnatal mother and the divided nature of the dialogic 
subject, a subject which cannot be secured as a singularity. When Kristeva 
talks of the maternal as a site of splitting, therefore, she employs it as a 
metaphorical device to illustrate the temporary constitution of the subject, 
a subject-in-process. Metaphor (from the Greek metapherein meaning “to 
carry or transfer,” or “to carry beyond”), is etymologically connected to the 
root “to bear children” or “to give birth to” as well as “to transgress,” and 
thus to matter (materiality and mother). Metaphor, like the subject-in-
process and the maternal body, is always other to itself – it does not 
provide meaning as purely present but rather gestures to a space beyond 
itself, leaving meaning deferred and in process. It is a space of suspension, 
and one that suggests a model of identity radically at odds with that of the 
self-same. Subjectivity, for Kristeva, appears to reside in a gap, and so the 
dialogue between the two columns in “Stabat Mater” gestures towards – 
orients the reader towards – the space in between, recalling Bakhtin’s 
notion of the constitution of the self as a form of intertextuality in the 
dialogue between self and other.55  
                                                 
53 Kristeva, Kristeva Reader, 297. 
54 Kristeva, Tales, 254. 
55 The structure of the text resembles Jacques Derrida’s novel Glas (trans. John P. Leavey, 
Jr. and Richard Rand. Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska Press, 1986 [1974]) and 
his two-columned essay “The Double Session” in Dissemination (trans. Barbara Johnson. 
London and New York: Continuum, 2004 [1981]). As Barbara Johnson argues in her 
introduction to Dissemination, this type of double typography suggests “that an effort is 
being made to call the reader’s attention to the syntactical function of spacing in the act of 
reading” (p. xxviii). 
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Many of Kristeva’s critics accuse her of essentialising an equation of 
femininity with maternality, or alternately of prioritising the semiotic over 
the symbolic or vice versa. Paul Smith, for example, accuses Kristeva of 
turning “her emphasis away from the mutually constraining dialectic 
between the semiotic and the symbolic, and toward a revindication of a 
putative priority and primacy of the semiotic.”56 Alternatively, Judith 
Butler contends that Kristeva’s theorisation of the semiotic as a subversive 
force reifies the hegemonic power of the symbolic because the paternal law 
is what imposes the illusion that femininity is somehow outside of the 
symbolic.57 However, Kristeva’s theorisation of the temporal and spatial 
simultaneity of the semiotic and the symbolic suggests a greater 
coincidence between their respective projects than Butler allows. Kristeva 
has suggested, for example, that “bio-psychological processes” are 
“already inescapably part of the [symbolic] signifying process.”58 When 
“Stabat Mater” is read in the context of Kristeva’s broader theoretical 
arguments regarding the dialogic relationship between self and other, 
inside and outside, the semiotic and the symbolic, it becomes clear that 
neither take priority but are rather interdependent. To suggest otherwise 
misreads the transgressive – dialogic – subjectivity that is represented by 
Kristeva’s figuration of the subject-in-process. Thus Kristeva’s critics read 
“Stabat Mater” selectively, confusing either right-hand or left-hand column 
with Kristeva’s own position on motherhood instead of recognising that the 
columns are in a dialogic relationship and consist in a description and 
critique of what motherhood has signified within patriarchal systems such 
as the Christian tradition of Marian devotion and Freudian psychoanalysis. 
Elizabeth Grosz, for example, singles out the left-hand column as the 
subject of her critique and suggests that  
 
Kristeva focuses her analysis of maternity, not on the experience of motherhood, 
nor on women’s representations of maternity, but on phallocentric textual images, 
most particularly those of the Virgin Mother presented in Christian theology.59  
 
                                                 
56 Paul Smith, Discerning the Subject (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 
126. 
57 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York and 
London: Routledge, 1990), 82. 
58 Kristeva, Kristeva Reader, 28. 
59 Grosz, Elizabeth, Jacques Lacan: A Feminist Introduction (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1990), 162-163. 
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Those commentators who attend to the right-hand column accuse Kristeva 
of conflating motherhood with femininity, reducing it to a marginal 
corporeal domain.60 However, Kristeva herself resists such readings when, 
in “Stabat Mater,” she critiques the “resorption of femininity within the 
Maternal,” calling it a “masculine appropriation … which is only a fantasy 
masking primary narcissism.”61 Moreover, while she maintains a 
perspectival link to the experiences of actual mothers (indeed, she must to 
sustain the metaphor’s resonance), I think a reading of the text as a dialogic 
and performative rendering of processual subjectivity indicates that 
Kristeva holds these experiences open to others too. Consequently, I agree 
with Edelstein when she advocates that “there’s something to be gained by 
(plural) theories or metaphors of the maternal that allow mothers, child-
free women, and even men to become (rather than be) ‘maternal’.”62 I think 
there is an argument, therefore, for seeing the maternal as a synonym (and 
certainly not the only possible one) for dialogic subjectivity. Kristeva 
certainly articulates a conception of motherhood at significant odds with 
the dominant patriarchal accounts she recounts in the left-hand column, 
however much it is in dialogue with elements of these accounts.  
The dialogic mode Kristeva’s conception inscribes, moreover, is framed 
specifically as an ethical orientation towards otherness intended to resist 
totalitarian and oppressive social systems. The socio-political domain as 
the specific focus of her theorising of maternality as a model of ethics is 
another aspect of the text that indicates that she has in her sights a broader 
project than that of merely providing an account of motherhood that resists 
patriarchal idealisations. Kristeva has insisted throughout her work that 
rethinking the maternal body has to be inseparable from rethinking 
language as social structuration. Maternality consequently is not reduced to 
mute biologism, or a naïve mystification of the prelinguistic unity between 
mother and child. Her complex and rich body of writing implies that the 
question of the maternal is necessarily intertwined with the reconfiguration 
of language as a social practice rather than merely a nostalgic return to 
what is, in patriarchal discourse, a prelinguistic phantasy of maternal 
emptiness. Her alternative model of maternality is equally, therefore, an 
                                                 
60 Stanton, Domna C. “Difference on Trial: A Critique of the Maternal Metaphor in 
Cixous, Irigaray, and Kristeva,” in eds. Jeffner Allen and Iris Marion Young The Thinking 
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61 Kristeva, Tales, 236. 
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alternative model of subjectivity and of ethics to the degree that these can 
each be characterised as herethical formulations. 
 
IV 
 
Herethics: An Outlaw Ethics for the Dialogic Self 
 
I began this essay by calling attention to the attenuated nature of ethical 
reflection and modelling in the literature generated by the political turn in 
the study of religions. I want, in my closing remarks, to indicate more 
concretely, although necessarily briefly, how Kristeva proposes an ethical 
model that is a helpful heuristic instrument for reimagining relationships 
between theory, data and concept formation, and for conceiving of 
subjectivity as heterogeneous and dialogically constituted. Coinciding with 
the original title of the essay, Kristeva advocates a neologistic “héréthique” 
(“a heretical ethics…a herethics”) based on the conception of the mother 
who relates to the other through and with love rather than the Law,63 whose 
own subjectivity is interleaved with that of the child’s and subsequently 
transformed in the encounter. Kristeva presents maternality as a model, 
founded on and then proceeding from the ambiguity of pregnancy and birth 
that oscillates between the inside and the outside, between subject and 
object to move towards an ethics that proceeds from the divided subject. 
Generally speaking, within the ontotheological tradition of western 
metaphysics, the ethical orientation towards others has postulated an 
autonomous agent, routinely inscribed as normatively male, whose 
obligations to the other come from “his” recognition that the other must be 
the same, or at least equivalent to, “himself.” In the Christian era, how one 
was supposed to act was dependent on what one understood God to be, that 
is, on one’s basic metaphysical commitments. In the aftermath of the 
Enlightenment, as God became more distant and more abstracted, the 
confessional basis for ethical judgement that justified moral rules in terms 
of duty or salvation receded. In its place, ethics moved to the empirical 
realm and was transformed into a descriptive utilitarianism, explained by 
David Hume in terms of what is “useful, or agreeable to a man himself, or 
to others.”64 The basis of ethics thus shifted from a pre-ordained religious 
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soteriology to one founded on human autonomy and use of reason. In the 
latter model, the autonomous subject of this ethics does not have a relation 
to any other qua other; rather it always and only has a relationship to the 
self-same, to another individual who can be posited as sharing the same or 
similar qualities. It effectively operates as a dualist system that must assert 
the self-same against an other who is representative of difference and who, 
on the basis of that difference, does not necessitate ethical responsiveness; 
the implication is a dialectic between self/other, same/different. Kristeva, 
in contrast, conceives of a notion of difference that does not operate 
according to a dualist logic of opposition but rather one of relationship and 
indebtedness insofar as one’s self is the gift of the other, the consequence 
of encounter with the other. Throughout her work Kristeva develops a 
series of ethical models that present an assumption of the other as inherent 
within oneself rather than as exterior – maternality is but one example – 
and which instantiate a “subject-in-process/on-trial.” She proposes that 
models of alterity can inform a new way to conceive of the structure of the 
relation to others and thereby produce a new way to conceive of ethics, or 
“herethics,” a term which well conveys the sense in which such an ethics 
goes against conventional, binary understandings of the self. As such it is 
an “outlaw ethics.”65 
Herethics is effectively an ethics that both challenges – rather than 
presupposes – the autonomous ethical agent that sets up obligations to the 
other as obligations to the self, and binds the subject to the other through 
love and not through the interdiction – the severance between bodies – 
required by “Law-of-the-Father.” It is thus an ethics which is predicated on 
a reaching out to, rather than overcoming, the other in recognition of the 
gift of the other. It is thus a sacrifice of singular, unitary identity: it is 
predicated on a meeting at the borders and of constitution in the space 
between. It offers an alternative to the individualism of a dualistic 
subjectivity that seeks a dialectical framework of self and other, distilling 
the essence of subjectivity into singularity through an agonistic encounter 
that ensures the triumph of the self-same over the other by means of the 
erasure or marginalisation of otherness as difference. The stress in 
Kristeva’s presentation of maternality provides, instead, a dialogical 
understanding of identity, open to both men and women as a metaphor – 
                                                                                                                          
Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975 [1748]), 336. 
65 Kelly Oliver, ed., Ethics, Politics, and Difference in Julia Kristeva’s Writing (New 
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an image which aids the imagination of a different economy of being and 
relationship – that seeks a non-agonistic encounter between self and other. 
Her representations of maternality and of the dialogic nature of the 
semiotic and symbolic that constitute the subject-in-process imply a 
prioritisation of heterogeneity over homogeneity, and this heterogeneity 
must be taken in a double sense: not only as the intersection of corporeality 
and language, but also as the intersection of two signifying economies, and 
of two subjects – plural, processual, intertextual and mutually constituting.  
The question remains, of course, as to how Kristeva’s model of 
“herethics” might be pursued heuristically to frame an ethical approach to 
the analysis of “religion.” The criticisms generated by the political turn 
with respect to the epistemological emptiness of “religion” as a homogenous, 
essentialisable, transcendent or universalisable signifier, seem, as I 
indicated above, to call for an ethical reflection on its usability – the strong 
implication being that there is something intellectually, if not ethically 
suspect with continuing to wield it at all. However, the intellectual debate 
that has filled appears not to matter to millions of people who identify 
themselves – heterogeneously – under its sign and who use it to make and 
shape the language with which they articulate their experiences, their 
internal and collective sensibilities, and their political, social, or familial 
commitments. I fear that in the rush to attend to the political dimensions of 
category-making in the field, what may result is the denial of the 
(disruptive? marginalised?) voices of those for whom category-making is 
rather ongoing meaning-making which enables assertions and contestations 
of belonging, well-being and agency. In not attending to these voices – not 
recognising their re-formulation, reactiviation and reorientation of 
intellectual codings – we run the risk of placing them at a hierarchical 
distance from the scholar intent on demonstrating the banal ordinariness of 
those things that are, in fact, held by many to be extraordinary. Whilst 
scholars of the political turn are quite right to point to the alienating 
operations of sui generis phenomenology which mystifies and sacralises 
ordinary human behaviours, in the process legitimising inequitable social 
arrangements, or of the colonial invention of (religious) traditions that 
imposed a Christianised prototype of religiosity – traditions and cultures 
that then shaped their own self-understandings to a detrimental degree – 
we must be alert to the potentially damaging bifurcations that persist in our 
own reformist efforts, to those separations and divisions that are 
consequent upon our insistence that “the religious” is solely a matter for 
epistemology, and to the possibility that these efforts might in part be 
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motivated by a fear of contamination by that which exceeds – or 
transgresses – epistemological management. Thus, as Roberts insists, 
 
We ... must not ignore questions about the value of the pursuit of knowledge ... 
Why uncover the ideological pretensions of religious people? Without efforts to 
answer these kinds of questions, explanation and the search for knowledge simply 
result in the kind of sterile historicism [which is] ‘hostile and dangerous to life.’66 
 
It is when the epistemological is opened up to the heterogeneity of the 
ontological that a fruitful and ethical dialogue can begin. It seems to me 
that Kristeva’s dialogic model of maternality, of subjectivity as an 
interleaving of heterogeneous modalities, proposes a promising – though 
not necessarily wholly unproblematic67 – figuration through which scholars 
of religion can begin to locate – or at least recognise – themselves as 
“crossroad beings,” as subjects constituted dialogically by the demands of 
epistemological clarity and ontological fidelity, and by the re-presentation 
of categories from and by the place of the other. The other, let it be said the 
religious other, Jonathon Z. Smith has suggested, is the offspring, the 
“brain child” of the academic study of religion: 
 
Religion is solely the creation of the scholar’s study. It is created for the scholar’s 
analytic purposes by his imaginative acts of comparison and generalisation. 
Religion has no independent existence apart from the academy. For this reason, the 
student of religion, and most particularly the historian of religion, must be 
relentlessly self-conscious. Indeed, this self-consciousness constitutes his primary 
expertise, his foremost object of study.68 
 
The language of paternal self-creation, of male parthenogenesis here is 
both striking and tired, additionally troubling because of its exaggeration 
of the agency and power – potency – of the scholar, however cognisant he 
may be of the need to dismantle that power through self-reflection. The 
                                                 
66 Roberts, “Exposure and Explanation,” 167. 
67 I recognise, of course, that the image of “maternality” presented by Kristeva is not free 
of some of the problematic associations that are almost inevitable when the language of 
parentage is invoked – the potential for condescension – and the relationship of metaphor 
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risk that Smith’s proposal for the cultivation of “relentless” self-
consciousness runs, however, is that reflexivity can easily turn to self-
absorption. However, according to the logic and demands of herethics, the 
responsibility of the scholar qua “mother” must be to acknowledge that the 
creation of life, of subjectivity, even of categorisation, is a process of 
mutual, ongoing constitution: the mother-child metaphor as Kristeva 
reconfigures it is not by any means uni-directional. To take this model and 
apply it to an attempt at dialogic conceptualisation of “religion” might 
enable its reconfiguration as an intricately woven network of contingent, 
processual and transgressive sites of self-constitution between the academy 
and the field, one that opens a space for an ethical orientation towards 
otherness which is productive, open, and where scholars of religion might 
be cognisant of their debt to the “other modality.”  
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